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1 
Speech by Prime Minister Rudd: “Building on ASEAN’s 
Success – Towards an Asia Pacific Century” 
Singapore, 12 August 2008* 
[…] There is the continuing challenge of non-proliferation for which the 
next global challenge looms at the point of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 2010. 
The Australian Government has established an International 
Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. It will be 
co-chaired by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and 
former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi. The Commission 
has a big task in front of it. 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has done a good job over the past 
40 years in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But some states have 
sought to challenge the NPT. North Korea has developed a nuclear 
program – although we welcome the recent progress towards solving the 
question of this program. Other states, such as Iran, have defied the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and, in doing so, have undermined 
the Treaty. 
With the next five-yearly review of the Treaty due in 2010, we need to 
look at how we can strengthen support for the Treaty. We need to 
strengthen support for safeguards so that nuclear material is strictly 
controlled. And we need to develop new thinking about how we work 
towards the goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It is 
crucial that we build widespread support for the Treaty, across regions 
and between those states with nuclear weapons and those without. The 
Commission’s task is to help build that support. 
                                                      
*
 http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5643 
  
2 
Address by Prime Minister Rudd to the  
64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
New York, 23 September 2009* 
[…] This organisation was born in the shadow of nuclear weapons and 
that shadow remains today.  One truth remains absolutely clear: the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons can never make any country more secure. 
The nuclear test by North Korea this year was rightly condemned across 
the international community. It reiterates that the only path to safety is 
through the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. 
Australia is encouraged by the commitment of the US and Russia to 
further reduce their nuclear arsenals. But the international community 
must also progress the broader disarmament and non-proliferation 
agenda. 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has played a crucial role in 
limiting the spread of nuclear weapons - but the Treaty today is under 
challenge. We must work to ensure the Treaty's global security benefits 
are reinforced by a successful Review Conference in 2010. To 
reinvigorate global consensus and activism ahead of that Conference and 
beyond, Australia and Japan last year established the International 
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. In the 
next few months, the Commission will produce its final report. Its aim is 
to chart a practical and realistic course to achieve a strengthened non-
proliferation and disarmament regime, leading to the ultimate 
elimination of nuclear arsenals.  
Tomorrow's Security Council summit on non-proliferation and 
disarmament is important for us all. We must not lose the opportunity it 
offers to summon the political resolve to move towards a nuclear 
weapons-free world. 
                                                      
* http://www.pm.gov.au/node/6226 
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Press Release, International Commission on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament:  
“Commission Report Launched in Tokyo: Towards a 
Nuclear Weapon Free World”*  
Tokyo, 15 December 2009 
The Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-
proliferation and Disarmament, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A 
Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers”, was presented today in 
Tokyo to the Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan, their excellencies 
Kevin Rudd and Yukio Hatoyama, by the Commission Co-Chairs, 
former foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, at a 
ceremony at the Japanese Prime Minister’s residence.  
The full text of the report is available online at www.icnnd.org. 
 
The 230-page report, the most comprehensive of its kind yet produced, is 
the unanimous product of an independent global panel of fifteen 
commissioners, supported by a high-level international advisory board 
and worldwide network of research centres, who together brought an 
unprecedented level of technical and policy expertise, and strategic and 
political experience, to their year-long deliberations and consultations. 
Its detailed analysis, sharply focused policy recommendations, and 
short, medium and long term practical agendas, address the whole range 
of issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy with which policymakers are presently 
wrestling in the context of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review 
Conference and beyond.  
With new U.S. and Russian leadership seriously committed to nuclear 
disarmament action, there is a new opportunity - the first since the 
immediate post-World War II and post-Cold War years - to halt, and 
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reverse, the problem of nuclear weapons once and for all. The report 
describes, not just rhetorically but in the detail that policymakers need, 
how that opportunity can and should be seized.  
 
The starting point of the report is that the nuclear status quo is not an 
option. Nuclear weapons are [the] only ones ever invented that have the 
capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet, and present arsenals could 
do so many times over. It defies credibility that, so long as any such 
weapons exist, they will not one day be used, by accident, miscalculation 
or design. The problem of nuclear weapons is at least equal to climate 
change in terms of gravity - and much more immediate in its potential 
impact. 
The report evaluates in detail, making it clear that they defy 
complacency, the threats and risks associated with the failure to 
persuade existing nuclear-armed states to relinquish their weapons, to 
prevent new states acquiring them, to stop terrorist actors gaining access 
to them, and to properly manage a rapid expansion in civil nuclear 
energy.  
Among the more significant of the report’s 76 recommendations are: 
• The setting of a medium term ‘minimization point’ target - to be 
reached by 2025 - of a world with less than 2,000 nuclear 
warheads - a more than 90 per cent reduction of present nuclear 
arsenals. 
• A full package of recommended outcomes for the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference, including a proposed new 20-point 
statement on disarmament, tough new measures against 
proliferation, and a suggested approach to moving forward the 
issue of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle 
East. 
• A plea for early movement by the nuclear-armed states on 
refining their nuclear doctrine to limit the role of nuclear 
weapons and give unequivocal assurances that they will not be 
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used against non-nuclear weapons states, and for a rethinking of 
existing approaches to ‘extended deterrence’ . 
• Support for the further development of civil nuclear energy, 
subject to effective security, safeguards and safety measures, 
and with much more attention being paid to proliferation 
resistant technologies and to creating disincentives to states 
building their own enrichment and reprocessing facilities. 
• Strong support for the continued delegitimisation of nuclear 
weapons, and the ultimate achievement of a completely nuclear 
weapon free world, while recognizing the many difficult 
conditions that will have to be satisfied before the movement 
from minimum levels to zero is achievable.
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Remarks by President Barack Obama  
Prague, 5 April 2009* 
 
[…] Now, one of those issues that I'll focus on today is fundamental to 
the security of our nations and to the peace of the world -– that's the 
future of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. 
The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous 
legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear war was fought between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge 
that their world could be erased in a single flash of light. Cities like 
Prague that existed for centuries, that embodied the beauty and the 
talent of so much of humanity, would have ceased to exist. 
Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons 
have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war 
has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More 
nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black 
market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The 
technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to 
buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered 
on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations 
break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold. 
Now, understand, this matters to people everywhere. One nuclear 
weapon exploded in one city -– be it New York or Moscow, Islamabad or 
Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague –- could kill hundreds of 
thousands of people. And no matter where it happens, there is no end to 
what the consequences might be -– for our global safety, our security, 
our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival. 
                                                      
*
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Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot 
be checked -– that we are destined to live in a world where more nations 
and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction. Such fatalism 
is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear 
weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves 
that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable. 
Just as we stood for freedom in the 20th century, we must stand 
together for the right of people everywhere to live free from fear in the 
21st century. And as nuclear power –- as a nuclear power, as the only 
nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a 
moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, 
but we can lead it, we can start it. 
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to 
seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I'm not 
naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my 
lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must 
ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to 
insist, "Yes, we can."  
Now, let me describe to you the trajectory we need to be on. First, the 
United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear 
weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of 
nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do 
the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United 
States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any 
adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies –- including the 
Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal. 
To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. President 
Medvedev and I began this process in London, and will seek a new 
agreement by the end of this year that is legally binding and sufficiently 
bold. And this will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to 
include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor. 
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To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will 
immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, 
it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned. 
And to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States 
will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile 
materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons. If we are serious 
about stopping the spread of these weapons, then we should put an end 
to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create 
them. That's the first step.  
Second, together we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty as a basis for cooperation. 
The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move 
towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not 
acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. To 
strengthen the treaty, we should embrace several principles. We need 
more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections. 
We need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking 
the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause. 
And we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, 
including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access 
peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must 
be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially 
developing countries embarking on peaceful programs. And no approach 
will succeed if it's based on the denial of rights to nations that play by 
the rules. We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our 
efforts to combat climate change, and to advance peace opportunity for 
all people. 
But we go forward with no illusions. Some countries will break the rules. 
That's why we need a structure in place that ensures when any nation 
does, they will face consequences. 
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Just this morning, we were reminded again of why we need a new and 
more rigorous approach to address this threat. North Korea broke the 
rules once again by testing a rocket that could be used for long range 
missiles. This provocation underscores the need for action –- not just this 
afternoon at the U.N. Security Council, but in our determination to 
prevent the spread of these weapons. 
Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean 
something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these 
weapons. Now is the time for a strong international response, and North 
Korea must know that the path to security and respect will never come 
through threats and illegal weapons. All nations must come together to 
build a stronger, global regime. And that's why we must stand shoulder 
to shoulder to pressure the North Koreans to change course. 
Iran has yet to build a nuclear weapon. My administration will seek 
engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We 
believe in dialogue. But in that dialogue we will present a clear choice. 
We want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations, 
politically and economically. We will support Iran's right to peaceful 
nuclear energy with rigorous inspections. That's a path that the Islamic 
Republic can take. Or the government can choose increased isolation, 
international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region 
that will increase insecurity for all. 
So let me be clear: Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a 
real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran's neighbors and our 
allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing 
to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran 
persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-
effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a 
stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense 
construction in Europe will be removed.  
So, finally, we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear 
weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global 
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security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive 
destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no 
problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear 
material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a 
sense of purpose without delay. 
So today I am announcing a new international effort to secure all 
vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will 
set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new 
partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials. 
We must also build on our efforts to break up black markets, detect and 
intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this 
dangerous trade. Because this threat will be lasting, we should come 
together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and 
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable 
international institutions. And we should start by having a Global 
Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the 
next year.  
Now, I know that there are some who will question whether we can act 
on such a broad agenda. There are those who doubt whether true 
international cooperation is possible, given inevitable differences among 
nations. And there are those who hear talk of a world without nuclear 
weapons and doubt whether it's worth setting a goal that seems 
impossible to achieve. 
But make no mistake: We know where that road leads. When nations 
and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf 
between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays 
forever beyond our grasp. We know the path when we choose fear over 
hope. To denounce or shrug off a call for cooperation is an easy but also 
a cowardly thing to do. That's how wars begin. That's where human 
progress ends. 
 11 
 
There is violence and injustice in our world that must be confronted. We 
must confront it not by splitting apart but by standing together as free 
nations, as free people. I know that a call to arms can stir the souls of 
men and women more than a call to lay them down. But that is why the 
voices for peace and progress must be raised together.  
Those are the voices that still echo through the streets of Prague. Those 
are the ghosts of 1968. Those were the joyful sounds of the Velvet 
Revolution. Those were the Czechs who helped bring down a nuclear-
armed empire without firing a shot. 
Human destiny will be what we make of it. And here in Prague, let us 
honor our past by reaching for a better future. Let us bridge our 
divisions, build upon our hopes, accept our responsibility to leave this 
world more prosperous and more peaceful than we found it. Together we 
can do it. 
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Statement by President Barack Obama on the Release of 
Nuclear Posture Review* 
6 April 2010 
One year ago yesterday in Prague, I outlined a comprehensive agenda to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to pursue the peace and 
security of a world without them.  I look forward to advancing this 
agenda in Prague this week when I sign the new START Treaty with 
President Medvedev, committing the United States and Russia to 
substantial reductions in our nuclear arsenals. 
Today, my Administration is taking a significant step forward by 
fulfilling another pledge that I made in Prague - to reduce the role of 
nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and focus on reducing 
the nuclear dangers of the 21st century, while sustaining a safe, secure 
and effective nuclear deterrent for the United States and our allies and 
partners as long as nuclear weapons exist.  
The Nuclear Posture Review, led by the Department of Defense, 
recognizes that the greatest threat to U.S. and global security is no 
longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by 
violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of 
states.  Moreover, it recognizes that our national security and that of our 
allies and partners can be increasingly defended by America’s 
unsurpassed conventional military capabilities and strong missile 
defenses.  
As a result, we are taking specific and concrete steps to reduce the role of 
nuclear weapons while preserving our military superiority, deterring 
aggression and safeguarding the security of the American people.  
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First, and for the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
terrorism is now at the top of America’s nuclear agenda, which affirms 
the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  We 
have aligned our policies and proposed major funding increases for 
programs to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the 
world.  Our nuclear security summit next week will be an opportunity 
for 47 nations to commit to specific steps to pursue the goal of securing 
all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four 
years.  And next month in New York, we will work with the wider world 
to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime to ensure that all 
nations uphold their responsibilities. 
Second, we are further emphasizing the importance of nations meeting 
their NPT and nuclear non-proliferation obligations through our 
declaratory policy. The United States is declaring that we will not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states 
that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in 
compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.  This 
enables us to sustain our nuclear deterrent for the narrower range of 
contingencies in which these weapons may still play a role, while 
providing an additional incentive for nations to meet their NPT 
obligations.  Those nations that fail to meet their obligations will 
therefore find themselves more isolated, and will recognize that the 
pursuit of nuclear weapons will not make them more secure. 
Finally, we are fulfilling our responsibilities as a nuclear power 
committed to the NPT.  The United States will not conduct nuclear 
testing and will seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.  The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads or 
pursue new military missions or new capabilities for nuclear weapons.  
As I stated last year in Prague, so long as nuclear weapons exist, we will 
maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal that guarantees the defense 
of the United States, reassures allies and partners, and deters potential 
adversaries.  To that end, we are seeking substantial investments to 
improve infrastructure, strengthen science and technology, and retain 
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the human capital we need to sustain our stockpile, while also 
strengthening the conventional capabilities that are an important part 
of our deterrent. The nuclear strategy we’re announcing today therefore 
reaffirms America’s  unwavering commitment to the security of our 
allies and partners, and advances American national security. 
To stop the spread of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear terrorism, and 
pursue the day when these weapons do not exist, we will work 
aggressively to advance every element of our comprehensive agenda - to 
reduce arsenals, to secure vulnerable nuclear materials, and to 
strengthen the NPT.  These are the steps toward the more secure future 
that America seeks, and this is the work that we are advancing today. 
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Press Conference by President Obama at the Nuclear 
Security Summit 
Washington D.C., 13 April 2010* 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Good afternoon, everybody.  We have just 
concluded an enormously productive day.  
I said this morning that today would be an opportunity for our nations, 
both individually and collectively, to make concrete commitments and 
take tangible steps to secure nuclear materials so they never fall into the 
hands of terrorists who would surely use them.  
This evening, I can report that we have seized this opportunity, and 
because of the steps we’ve taken -- as individual nations and as an 
international community -- the American people will be safer and the 
world will be more secure. […] 
So today is a testament to what is possible when nations come together 
in a spirit of partnership to embrace our shared responsibility and 
confront a shared challenge.  This is how we will solve problems and 
advance the security of our people in the 21st century.  And this is 
reflected in the communiqué that we have unanimously agreed to today. 
First, we agreed on the urgency and seriousness of the threat.  Coming 
into this summit, there were a range of views on this danger.  But at our 
dinner last night, and throughout the day, we developed a shared 
understanding of the risk.  
Today, we are declaring that nuclear terrorism is one of the most 
challenging threats to international security.  We also agreed that the 
most effective way to prevent terrorists and criminals from acquiring 
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nuclear materials is through strong nuclear security -- protecting nuclear 
materials and preventing nuclear smuggling. 
Second, I am very pleased that all the nations represented here have 
endorsed the goal that I outlined in Prague one year ago -- to secure all 
vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years’ time.  This 
is an ambitious goal, and we are under no illusions that it will be 
easy.  But the urgency of the threat, and the catastrophic consequences 
of even a single act of nuclear terrorism, demand an effort that is at once 
bold and pragmatic.  And this is a goal that can be achieved. 
Third, we reaffirmed that it is the fundamental responsibility of nations, 
consistent with their international obligations, to maintain effective 
security of the nuclear materials and facilities under our control.  This 
includes strengthening national laws and policies, and fully 
implementing the commitments we have agreed to. 
And fourth, we recognized that even as we fulfill our national 
responsibilities, this threat cannot be addressed by countries working in 
isolation.  So we’ve committed ourselves to a sustained, effective 
program of international cooperation on national [sic] security, and we 
call on other nations to join us. 
It became clear in our discussions that we do not need lots of new 
institutions and layers of bureaucracy.  We need to strengthen the 
institutions and partnerships that we already have -— and make them 
even more effective.  This includes the United Nations, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, the multilateral partnership that strengthens 
nuclear security, prevent nuclear trafficking and assist nations in 
building their capacity to secure their nuclear materials.    
But as I said, today was about taking tangible steps to protect our 
people.  So we’ve also agreed to a detailed work plan to guide our efforts 
going forward -- the specific actions we will take.  I want to commend 
my partners for the very important commitments that they made in 
conjunction with this summit.  Let me give some examples. 
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Canada agreed to give up a significant quantity of highly enriched 
uranium.  Chile has given up its entire stockpile.  Ukraine and Mexico 
announced that they will do the same.  Other nations -- such as 
Argentina and Pakistan -- announced new steps to strengthen port 
security and prevent nuclear smuggling.  
More nations -- including Argentina, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam -- agreed to join, and thus strengthen, the treaties and 
international partnerships that are at the core of our global efforts.  A 
number of countries -— including Italy, Japan, India and China -— will 
create new centers to promote nuclear security technologies and 
training.  Nations pledged new resources to help the IAEA meet its 
responsibilities. 
In a major and welcomed development, Russia announced that it will 
close its last weapons-grade plutonium production reactor.  After many 
years of effort, I’m pleased that the United States and Russia agreed 
today to eliminate 68 tons of plutonium for our weapons programs -— 
plutonium that would have been enough for about 17,000 nuclear 
weapons.  Instead, we will use this material to help generate electricity 
for our people. 
These are exactly the kind of commitments called for in the work plan 
that we adopted today, so we’ve made real progress in building a safer 
world. 
I would also note that the United States has made its own 
commitments.  We are strengthening security at our own nuclear 
facilities, and will invite the IAEA to review the security at our neutron 
research center.  This reflects our commitment to sharing the best 
practices that are needed in our global efforts. We’re seeking significant 
funding increases for programs to prevent nuclear proliferation and 
trafficking.  
And today, the United States is joining with our Canadian partners and 
calling on nations to commit $10 billion to extending our highly 
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successful Global Partnership to strengthen nuclear security around the 
world. 
So this has been a day of great progress.  But as I said this morning, this 
can’t be a fleeting moment.  Securing nuclear materials must be a serious 
and sustained global effort.  We agreed to have our experts meet on a 
regular basis —- to measure progress, to ensure that we’re meeting our 
commitments and to plan our next steps.  
And I again want to thank President Lee and the Republic of Korea for 
agreeing to host the next Nuclear Security Summit in two years. 
Finally, let me say while this summit is focused on securing nuclear 
materials, this is part of a larger effort -— the comprehensive agenda 
that I outlined in Prague last year to pursue the peace and security of a 
world without nuclear weapons. Indeed, in recent days we’ve made 
progress on every element of this agenda. 
To reduce nuclear arsenals, President Medvedev and I signed the historic 
new START treaty —- not only committing our two nations to 
significant reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, but also setting the 
stage for further cuts and cooperation between our countries. 
To move beyond outdated Cold War thinking and to focus on the 
nuclear dangers of the 21st century, our new Nuclear Posture Review 
reduces the role and number of nuclear weapons in our national security 
strategy.  And for the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and 
nuclear terrorism is at the top of America’s nuclear agenda, which 
reaffirms the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. 
And next month in New York, we will join with nations from around the 
world to strengthen the NPT as the cornerstone of our global efforts to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons even as we pursue greater civil 
nuclear cooperation.  Because for nations that uphold their 
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responsibilities, peaceful nuclear energy can unlock new advances in 
medicine, in agriculture, and economic development.  
All of these efforts are connected.  Leadership and progress in one area 
reinforces progress in another.  When the United States improves our 
own nuclear security and transparency, it encourages others to do the 
same, as we’ve seen today.  When the United States fulfills our 
responsibilities as a nuclear power committed to the NPT, we strengthen 
our global efforts to ensure that other nations fulfill their 
responsibilities.  
So again, I want to thank my colleagues for making this unprecedented 
gathering a day of unprecedented progress in confronting one of the 
greatest threats to our global security.  Our work today not only 
advances the security of the United States, it advances the security of all 
mankind, and preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism will 
remain one of my highest priorities as President.       
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The NPT and Disarmament 
Marianne Hanson* 
 
 
The nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), negotiated in 1968 and 
which entered into force in 1970, was designed chiefly to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the Treaty’s other important 
function, enshrined in its Article VI, was to ensure the disarmament of 
the nuclear arsenals held by the nuclear weapon states. As such, the 
NPT remains the key institutional and legal mechanism by which the 
elimination of nuclear weapons can be pursued at a global level, and its 
five-yearly Review Conference provides the key opportunity for 
reviewing progress in this area.  
 
At no time in its 40 year history have there been such high expectations 
that the disarmament conditions of the Treaty can be filled than exist 
now at the 2010 Review Conference being held in New York. Yet it is 
not likely that these hopes for accelerated disarmament and substantial 
change on the rhetoric of nuclear weapons’ doctrines will be fulfilled. 
 
This is not to say that the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) will be 
unimportant. On the contrary, it will be seen as a fresh opportunity for 
serious debate, given that the past ten years have witnessed a stalemate 
in the contentious issue of nuclear weapons elimination. Most 
importantly, it will provide the venue for the United States to re-
commit itself at a very public and high diplomatic level to nuclear 
disarmament, after almost a decade of resistance to this idea by the 
Bush Administration. In this alone it will represent a vast improvement 
over the acrimonious Review Conference held in 2005, which was not 
able to advance the important steps designed to assist disarmament 
agreed to five years earlier.  
The 2005 RevCon, whose broader context was widespread 
disenchantment with US policies in the war on terror, was dominated by 
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the refusal of US Ambassador John Bolton to discuss US nuclear 
weapons elimination, by North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty, and 
by suspicions about Iran’s nuclear intentions. And while the US was 
often singled out as preventing agreement, it was also the sharp views of 
Iran and Egypt that determined the atmospherics of a largely 
unproductive meeting.  
The end result was no progress on important questions of proliferation, 
compliance and verification, even though most states wished to take 
action over North Korea's withdrawal from the regime and to persuade 
Iran to terminate its nuclear program. Neither was there any progress on 
disarmament. The ‘thirteen steps’ plan outlined in 2000 required that 
the nuclear weapon states would ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), accomplish substantial reductions in their nuclear 
arsenals, conduct changes to the operational status of nuclear weapons, 
conclude a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and move to a 
diminished role for nuclear weapons in their security policies, all of 
which were seen as vital stepping stones towards the eventual 
elimination of nuclear weapons. Not only were none of these steps 
achieved by 2005; even discussion of the 13 step plan was prevented in 
the heated and unproductive circumstances of the meeting.1 In the 
words of Joseph Cirincione: “the 2005 Review Conference was a 
disaster.”2 
This distinct lack of achievement helps explain the many hopes that are 
pinned on the 2010 meeting. And while it is reasonable to expect that 
the new government in Washington – more specifically President 
Obama’s very public commitment to nuclear disarmament – presages a 
more positive outcome for 2010, it is important to understand the limits 
of even Obama’s diplomatic preferences.  
 
Obama, more than any other US president, has shown a willingness to 
fulfill the NPT’s disarmament requirements. The treaty calls on nuclear 
weapon states (NWS) to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 
and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
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disarmament under strict and effective international control.”3 While 
the wording of this Article is vague, and has been contested by some of 
the nuclear weapon states as not conferring a strict legal obligation to 
disarm, it has nevertheless come to be interpreted by most states as a 
clear call for nuclear disarmament. This view was reinforced by the 1996 
International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the legality of 
nuclear weapons. Today, there is little contention that this Article 
imposes an obligation on the nuclear weapon states to disarm; regardless 
of the vagueness of the wording, that nuclear disarmament appears to be 
linked to a treaty on “general and complete disarmament”, and that no 
date has been specified for nuclear disarmament, we do not hear states 
challenging the disarmament interpretation of Article VI. Indeed, for 
the first time in the 30 year history of the NPT, all the NPT nuclear 
weapon states in 2000 gave an ‘unequivocal undertaking’ to accomplish 
the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 4  Moreover, the implied 
‘bargain’ of the NPT suggests very clearly that nuclear weapon states 
‘owe’ the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) the elimination of their 
arsenals, that disarmament (on the part of the NWS) is the flip side of 
the non-proliferation (on the part of the NNWS) coin.  
 
None of this is to suggest that disarmament alone can achieve non-
proliferation; no one is suggesting that if the nuclear weapon states 
move to zero, this in itself means that we will be freed of the danger of 
proliferation. Rather, what is argued is that the two-tiered system that 
prevails in the NPT, whereby some states are allowed nuclear weapons 
while others are denied them, is not sustainable in the longer term. It is 
clear that arguing against proliferation carries more moral and political 
authority if the arguer is seen to be abiding by the same rules. In this 
sense, Obama reflects a view not shared by the Bush Administration, 
which instead preferred to build a system where some states (the US 
included of course) would be seen as ‘responsible’ nuclear powers, 
deserving of their arsenals, while others, usually because of their ‘rogue’ 
nature, would be denied these. Under this attempt, what was being 
stigmatized was not the weapon itself, but rather the possessor of the 
weapon. This attempted reformulation of the NPT’s provisions was not, 
however, received well by the majority of states. The long-standing 
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taboo against nuclear weapons – the recognition of their huge 
destructive power – risked being diluted if it was only the nature of a 
possessing state that was to be at issue. The US was not therefore 
ultimately successful in seeking to make a special case for itself (and the 
other existing nuclear weapons states of Russia, China, Britain, France, 
and presumably India, Pakistan and Israel) retaining nuclear weapons. 
Indeed what is notable about the momentum towards the disarmament 
of nuclear weapons that has gathered since the early 1990s is that it is 
being pursued vigorously by a broad range of states, many of them allies 
and close political partners of the United States. (The governments of 
Australia, Japan, Norway and Canada are the most obvious activists in 
this issue).5  
 
In addition to the view that disarmament was a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for non-proliferation, and that the two-tiered 
system of the NPT could not be sustained in perpetuity was the 
recognition that the US (and others) would be in a far stronger position 
to challenge suspected proliferators if it was seen to be moving towards a 
position of zero itself. This is a key reason why Obama has flagged his 
ambition of nuclear disarmament so clearly: although his critics accuse 
him of idealism (a somewhat unfair claim, given that he acknowledges 
the difficult and very slow nature of a nuclear disarmament project) his 
positioning of the US as a global disarmer reduces the political space in 
which any other would-be proliferator can operate. It seems clear that 
Obama’s intention is to limit the political capital that North Korea, Iran 
or any other critic of the US might gain by pointing to a continuation of 
nuclear ‘double standards’. 
 
This is one reason why he has pursued a replacement for the START 
Treaty, and instigated some subtle changes in the wording of nuclear 
postures, together with a commitment not to develop new nuclear 
weapons, in the recently released US Nuclear Posture Review6 (although 
many argue that Obama could have gone much further in amending US 
policy). No doubt these measures, together with his April 2009 speech in 
Prague and his chairing of a special session of the UN Security Council 
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on nuclear weapons elimination, will have a positive effect on the way 
that the NPT Review Conference proceeds.   
 
The question remains however of whether these initiatives will be 
enough to carry the day at the RevCon. Initially, it was hoped that by 
May 2010, 16 months into his term, Obama would have succeeded in 
achieving Senate ratification of the CTBT, as well as of the new START 
agreement. But these predictions underestimated the degree of 
resistance the President would meet from the Republican Party, 
seemingly intent on preventing most legislation from moving forwards. 
It is also worth remembering that for Obama, and certainly for most 
Americans, foreign policy is probably low down on his list of things to 
do; for most, reform of the health care system and tending to financial 
woes were the real priorities. Given this, and especially the fact that 
Obama could not command the supermajority of 67 votes needed to pass 
the CTBT through the Senate, he was wise not to attempt this. Another 
defeat of this important treaty, as happened in 1999, would have been 
far worse than arriving without it in New York, as Obama will be forced 
to do. 
 
For the non-nuclear weapon states, the issue will be this: will the 
completion (but not ratification) of the START agreement, the new 
wording of the Nuclear Posture Review, and Obama’s own personal 
commitment to ‘nuclear zero’ be sufficient to sustain an atmosphere of 
goodwill during the RevCon? Is his distinct rejection of Bush 
Administration policies enough to convince member states that he is 
serious about disarmament (the lack of a US ratified Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty notwithstanding)?  
 
If, as seems likely most states will recognise his personal commitment to 
disarmament, this will go some way towards reducing the kind of 
criticism of US nuclear policies that has prevailed for the past decade or 
so. It will also, presumably, assist the US in isolating and putting 
pressure on suspect states like Iran to roll back any nuclear weapon 
intentions they might harbor. If he is able to achieve this, and if he later 
can bring about CTBT ratification, as well as ratification of the all-
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important START treaty, then we will be able to say that the NPT’s 
disarmament objectives are beginning to be met.  
 
This is because while the mantle for nuclear disarmament rests heavily 
on the shoulders of the US, even small moves towards disarmament will 
have an impact on the other nuclear weapon states. China would almost 
certainly follow the US in ratification of the CTBT, in turn allowing for 
movement on the part of other non-signing states. Russia, for its part, is 
very keen to reduce its nuclear weapons and is desirous of the entry into 
force of the new START agreement.7 Britain and France have both 
expressed support for Obama’s push for zero (more volubly so in the UK 
than in France) and any increasing momentum over the next decade or 
so will undoubtedly have some authoritative influence on the positions 
of the non-NPT nuclear weapon states: India, Pakistan and Israel. None 
of this is to under-estimate the very real difficulties that lie in the way of 
nuclear disarmament or the fact that this process, if it occurs at all, is 
likely to take decades to complete. But what it does suggest is that the 
log-jam in implementing identified steps towards disarmament, might be 
beginning to clear, even if this will be at a pace far slower than initially 
expected. In this sense, the NPT Review Conference might not be able 
to bring out a radically new or progressive final document but it will, 
with luck, benefit from the positive statement and small moves towards 
disarmament already made evident by the new US Administration. 
 
There are further elements that would assist the road to disarmament, 
and which could be incorporated into the NPT process. Australia, 
together with 16 other states, has submitted a Working Paper – Further 
Strengthening the Review Process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons – which proposes changing the preparatory 
conferences, typically held every year for three years prior to any 
Review Conference, into a system of Annual General Conferences and 
one preparatory conference.8 This would have the effect of all states 
meeting every year to discuss disarmament and non-proliferation issues 
under the NPT, allowing for greater assessment of progress made and for 
improvements in implementation. The paper also proposed the creation 
of a Chairs’ Circle, to utilise the accumulated wisdom of RevCon Chairs, 
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as well as a Treaty Support Unit. In particular, the plan for yearly 
review meetings would go a long way towards keeping disarmament and 
non-proliferation in the spotlight and focusing attention on violations or 
specific problem areas. Australia, together with Japan, has submitted a 
further Working Paper – A New Package of Practical Nuclear 
Disarmament and Non-proliferation Measures for the 2010 Review 
Conference – which reaffirms the 13 steps outlined in previous years, but 
which also adds some useful new areas for implementation.9  
 
A further instrument able to assist disarmament within the NPT is the 
report of the International Commission for Nuclear Non-proliferation 
and Disarmament, co-chaired by Australia and Japan. It calls for the 
delegitimizing of nuclear weapons, and for nuclear reductions to take 
place in a two-phase process, with reductions down to 2000 weapons by 
2025, a ‘minimization point’, after which time states would proceed to 
negotiate the complex and difficult steps towards the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons.10 The Report has gathered significant 
attention and has been presented to member states at the Review 
Conference. If implemented, it will reinforce the 13 steps plan and 
previous reports and studies designed to advance disarmament. Other 
studies have suggested specific recommendations to the United States 
and others, with many emphasizing the important role that 
nongovernmental actors can also play in enhancing the prospects for 
disarmament.11 
 
In sum, the 2010 Review Conference is likely to mirror the renewed 
hopes visible at a global level for achieving nuclear weapons 
disarmament, largely because of the new commitment shown by the 
United States, a commitment which has been supported by other NPT 
nuclear weapon states. As noted however, the expectations of this 
meeting should not be inflated. There are some useful measures that can 
be achieved, most importantly perhaps a sense that disarmament needs 
to be a joint endeavour, requiring commitment and good will for many 
years; it will be important for member states to work collaboratively 
both in the NPT and individually to foster this goal. There is more to be 
gained by contributing to an on-going and collaborative atmosphere 
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than there is by focusing on the continued lack of actual treaties, such as 
the CTBT or a ratified START agreement. At the very least, new US 
policies will go some way towards reducing the bitter divisions that 
existed so strongly five years ago, something which in turn should 
reassure US policymakers, and which with luck will carry over into the 
2015 Conference. 
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Flaws in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Richard Broinowski* 
This commentary considers tensions in the NPT regime between 
permissible peaceful use of nuclear fission and preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons. 
The two main aims of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to grant adherents the 
‘inalienable right’ to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including 
the rights to enrich or purchase uranium enriched in the isotope U235. I 
will argue that these are fundamentally incompatible objectives, but 
before doing so, it is useful to outline non-proliferation manoeuvres that 
preceded the Treaty. 
Even before the atom bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early 
August 1945, scientists in the Manhattan project had been urging the 
American government not to drop the bomb on Japan. In 1942, Leo 
Szilard had told President Roosevelt that peace was not possible if 
various sovereign states had atom bombs. In 1944, atomic scientists at 
the University of Chicago advocated the creation of an international 
administration with police powers ‘to effectively control the means of 
nucleonic warfare’. In 1945, a joint statement by American, British and 
Canadian scientists argued to their governments that there was no 
defence against nuclear weapons, and no country could maintain a 
monopoly over nuclear technology. 
Plans to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation while propagating so-
called ‘peaceful’ nuclear technology gathered momentum during the late 
1940s and early 1950s. In 1946, the newly formed United Nations 
General Assembly met in London and created an Atomic Energy Agency 
charged with ensuring atomic energy could only be used for peaceful 
purposes. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and David 
                                                      
*
 Adjunct Professor, University of Sydney 
  
30 
Lilienthal of the Tennessee Valley Authority proposed to President 
Truman that the United States retain a monopoly on uranium 
enrichment, but distribute ‘denatured’ fissile materials to countries 
wishing to pursue peaceful nuclear technology. A self-promoting 
American hardliner appointed by President Truman to manage the 
issue, Bernard Baruch, rejected the Acheson-Lilienthal plan and 
proposed that the United States retain its nuclear weapons monopoly 
until nuclear weapons held by other countries, particularly the Soviet 
Union, were verifiably destroyed. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
rejected Baruch’s demand, and proposed the United States destroy its 
nuclear arsenal first. 
The United States had no such intention, and clung to the hope that it 
could keep its nuclear weapons secrets from the rest of the world, 
particularly how to separate the fissionable uranium isotope U235 from 
U238, and how to create and detonate Plutonium 239.  But as the 
Soviets and British, and then the Swiss, Swedish and French all moved 
towards developing their own nuclear technology, the Americans, no 
doubt seeking supporters in the Cold War, suddenly switched from 
secrecy to openness in the hope of maintaining control over further 
proliferation. In December 1953, President Eisenhower announced his 
‘Atoms for Peace’ program, which included training foreign nuclear 
engineers and scientists at the new American School of Nuclear Science 
and Engineering at Argonne in Illinois, and giving research reactors to 
nascent nuclear research establishments on other countries.1 Driving his 
agenda was the speculative view of American nuclear scientists that 
nuclear weapons technology could be adapted to constructive uses, to 
drive ships and aircraft, enhance human health through radiation 
therapy and diagnostic procedures, increase agricultural production and 
food preservation, track soil erosion, dredge canals and create harbours, 
find geothermal fields, and above all, generate cheap electricity. The 
genie was out of the nuclear bottle. 
The idea of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was an American 
and Soviet reaction to the first French atomic test in the Sahara in 
February 1960. For the first time in history, a country had developed its 
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own bomb independently and against the wishes of the super powers. 
The driving motive of Washington and Moscow in pushing the Treaty 
was the desire to ensure that other countries, particularly West 
Germany, did not also become nuclear weapons states. But the Germans 
did not wish to be so constrained, and their motive was to keep a nuclear 
option open within the Treaty’s framework, liberalise the use of 
plutonium for so-called commercial purposes and water down safeguards 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Between 1961 and 
1974, German politicians assailed the proposed Treaty. Konrad 
Adenauer called it a ‘death sentence’ for the Federal Republic. Franz 
Josef Strauss said it was ‘a new Versailles of cosmic dimensions’. Helmut 
Schmidt regarded it as ‘questionable’. The German newspaper Bild 
characterised the proposed Treaty as a ‘Dictat of the atomic giants’.2   
This obduracy was shared by other European states and Japan. The 
strength of opposition became clear to an Australian mission keen to sell 
uranium to world markets in 1977. Travelling on Prime Minister 
Fraser’s instructions to explain Australia’s new bilateral safeguards 
regime that would in future apply to all shipments of Australian 
uranium, the mission went to London, Rome, Brussels, Paris, Bonn and 
Tokyo in June and July 1977. It quickly found that potential customers 
were unwilling to sign any bilateral safeguards agreement that 
demanded specific case-by-case Australian approval for the transfer, 
enrichment or re-processing of Australian originating nuclear material 
(AONM). Automatic approval for such procedures must be allowed. 
Fearing that it would lose out on uranium sales during a global uranium 
glut, the Australian government quickly modified its safeguards by 
introducing ‘programmed’ (ie automatic) approval. Over the remaining 
Fraser years, and throughout the Hawke and Keating administrations 
that followed, other ‘strict’ conditions in Australian safeguards were 
modified one by one in the interests of commercial and international 
demands.3  
German diplomacy, more than the advocacy of any other state, was thus 
responsible for Article IV of the Treaty which allowed signatories to 
retain the inalienable right to develop or acquire nuclear technology for 
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peaceful purposes, including the right to enrich uranium or re-process 
spent nuclear fuel. This ‘stand-by’ provision gave them the capacity to 
shift to extensive uranium or plutonium production for military 
purposes within a period of months if they felt motivated to do so.  
Thus we have a fundamental tension, a contradiction, within the 
framework of the NPT. Article I binds the Nuclear Weapons States 
(NWS) not to transfer nuclear weapons technology to non-NWS. Article 
II extracts a promise from the non-NWS not to acquire or develop 
nuclear weapons technology. Article III extracts a promise from the 
non-NWS to abide by International Atomic Energy (IAEA) Safeguards. 
Yet Article IV promotes the inalienable right of all non-NWS to access 
the full range of so-called peaceful nuclear technology, a technology that 
is the same as the technology to acquire nuclear weaponry. The 
American academic Albert Wohlstetter once ironically remarked that 
Article IV gives non-NWS what they regard as ‘a natural right to Life, 
Liberty and the Pursuit of Plutonium.’ A signatory may develop 
centrifuges to enrich uranium providing they are subject to IAEA 
safeguards and are producing substantially less than weapons-grade 
enriched uranium. Defying heavy suspicions from the United States and 
Israel about the purpose of its nuclear programs, Iran is nonetheless 
correct in claiming that as a member of the NPT it has a right to 
develop an enrichment capacity for ‘peaceful purposes.’ That it may 
further down the track covertly enrich its uranium to weapons grade or 
extract weapons grade uranium or plutonium from its reactors will be 
unlawful under the terms of the NPT, but it can walk away from the 
Treaty  and sanctions will apply too late to stop its technical procedures.  
Iraq nearly got away with similar deceptions before the first Gulf War, 
and when IAEA inspectors discovered the extent to which Saddam had 
utilised NPT-sanctioned access to nuclear technology for a weapons 
program, they were shocked. An additional protocol allowing more 
intrusive inspections of non-NWS nuclear facilities was negotiated as a 
result, but even this will not stop non-NWS using rights granted under 
the NPT from pursuing weapons programs if they are determined to do 
so.     
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A second tension within the NPT regime is the failure of the five NWS 
to honour their obligation under Article VI to reduce and eventually 
abolish their nuclear inventories. This has been interpreted by non-NWS 
as ignoring a clear and decisive obligation. By failing to act, the NWS 
are seen as imposing a double standard on the world namely “we are 
allowed to have nuclear weapons, but you are not”. The NWS have 
argued in response that they are not subject to time-bound guarantees 
to disarm, and that they will get around doing so in due course.  
But this double standard and access by non-NWS to nuclear technology 
constitute what the just-retired head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei 
has described as the ‘Achilles heel’ of the NPT. At symposia on 
international safeguards in October 2006 and May 2007, he forcefully 
argued that inherent security risks exist in a world of multiple ‘virtual 
Nuclear Weapon States’. He advocated a new international or 
multinational approach to the nuclear fuel cycle so as to avoid ending up 
with not just nine, but 20-30 additional states which will have the 
capacity to develop nuclear weapons in a very short span of time.4 
The enthusiasm with which the international nuclear industry has 
embraced nuclear technology as the only way to save the world from 
global warming is misguided and premature and ignores alternative soft-
energy paths. 5  Due to the enormous capital costs of new nuclear 
reactors, component supply log jams, lack of community acceptance, 
national skepticism6 and the unreliability of construction estimates, a 
sudden burst in their construction around the world is still a long way 
off. Meanwhile the total number of nuclear power reactors on line in the 
world is continuing to shrink.7 Nor have technical problems involved in 
isolating spent nuclear fuel from the biosphere for the required 
thousands of years been achieved. And according to authoritative 
articles in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the optimistic talk about 
the safety and immunity from weapons diversion of Generation IV or 
pebble-bed or thorium-fuelled reactors is theoretical. Most designs are 
still fuelled by paper and moderated by ink. As for claims that mixed 
oxide fuels from re-processing irradiated fuel rods from light water 
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reactors can be used in breeder reactors to ‘burn up’ weapons-grade 
uranium or plutonium, practical application is lacking.8  
A third tension within the NPT concerns the fiction that ‘peaceful’ 
electricity-generating nuclear reactors cannot be used for making 
nuclear weapons. Most existing light-water reactors do not produce 
fissile material at the end of a normal operating cycle. But if the fuel 
rods are removed before the end of the cycle, they will contain 
fissionable plutonium, Pu 239, that has not yet had time to convert to 
less weapons-effective Pu 240 or 241. The plutonium and unused 
uranium 235 can under such conditions be separated during re-
processing from actinides and other transuranic elements in the fuel 
rods, and used in nuclear weapons. A new generation of reactors – 
including Generation IV, pebble-bed or thorium-fuelled – are claimed by 
the nuclear industry and uranium miners to be much safer than earlier 
reactors. But they still produce spent fuel containing the same 
fissionable products capable of separation through reprocessing for use 
in weapons.   
In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy predicted that by the 
mid-1980s, fifteen to twenty countries would possess nuclear weapons. 
He was too pessimistic. By 2010 only nine countries have such weapons 
– the five NWS, three countries which acquired them as non-NPT 
signatories – India, Pakistan and Israel – and North Korea, which could 
arguably be seen as still an NPT member because it did not formally 
resign, despite walking away from the Treaty in 2009. Iran, another 
NPT signatory, may become the tenth nuclear weapons power, although 
if and when this happens is uncertain. 
Meanwhile some recent events indicate that we may not yet be 
ineluctably drifting towards life in a comprehensively nuclear-armed 
world. In 2007, four eminent and conservative Americans - George 
Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn argued in the 
Wall Street Journal for much more assertive action to reduce nuclear 
arsenals and work towards a non-nuclear world. In June 2008 an 
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation was set up, and 
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with a heterogeneous bunch of participants  from Mexico, Indonesia, 
Britain, China, the United States, Germany, India, Pakistan, France, 
South Africa, Russia and Saudi Arabia, co-chaired by two former 
Foreign Ministers – Gareth Evans from Australia and Yoriko 
Kawaguchi from Japan. In March 2010 it tabled its package on nuclear 
disarmament, a conservative reiteration of support for three nuclear 
‘pillars’: disarmament, a stronger NPT regime and expanded peaceful 
nuclear technologies. 
In April 2010, President Obama signed with Russian President 
Medvedev a new START weapons reduction treaty to ‘re-set’ bilateral 
relations by cutting American and Russian nuclear weapons, missiles 
and launchers by about a third. Obama announced these moves to a 
cheering Czech crowd in Prague the same month and foreshadowed his 
new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which reaffirmed an earlier pledge 
of the United States that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-
NWS which adhered to their obligations under the NPT. Later in April 
he convened a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, where the 
representatives of 47 countries focused on the challenge of securing 
vulnerable nuclear materials, particularly from terrorist threats.     
Taken together, these developments offered the impression that 
international progress was being made towards nuclear disarmament 
and the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. As a result, the 2010 
NPT Review Conference, convening at the beginning of May 2010, 
began in an optimistic frame of mind and might well conclude without 
dissolving in the kind of acrimony and lack of progress that marked  the 
2005 Review Conference.  
Yet there is still a long way to go. Over the last two decades, some 
countries such as Libya, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil have judged 
that their best national security interests lie in not pursuing a nuclear 
weapons option. Three former members of the Soviet Union – Ukraine, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan – similarly decided not to retain nuclear 
weapons left on their territory by Moscow following the 1989 break-up 
of the Soviet Empire. The trick will be to persuade threshold countries 
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like Iran that pursuing nukes is not in their best national interests -or to 
have them arrive at this conclusion themselves.  
Meanwhile, some sort of international acknowledgement about the 
proliferation dangers of expanding global nuclear power must be made. 
This will involve changing the NPT’s undertaking to present nuclear 
technology as an inalienable right. An urgent change to the NPT would 
be to exclude both enrichment and re-processing of nuclear fuel from 
that right, even if this would create another class of privileged countries 
such as non-NWS like Japan that already possess and exercise such 
technology. To withdraw such technology would be strenuously resisted 
in Tokyo, but not to do so would make it all but impossible to deny the 
same rights to other countries less advanced in nuclear technology. In 
this context, Obama’s proposal for an international enrichment and re-
processing resource under IAEA supervision might make sense.
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The Nuclear Policy of the Obama Administration 
Dr Andrew Newman* 
 
President Obama has embraced an ambitious nuclear agenda and has 
already taken several important steps toward realising his goals. He has 
signed a strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia, chaired a UN 
Security Council session that led to the adoption of a sweeping nuclear 
security resolution and hosted a nuclear summit dedicated to securing all 
vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. The 
President has also committed to “seek the peace and security of a world 
without nuclear weapons”, ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
negotiate an end to the production of fissile material for weapons and 
promote the safe and secure development of nuclear energy both 
domestically and internationally.  
This commentary will look at President Obama’s policy in four sections: 
promoting nuclear disarmament; preventing nuclear proliferation; 
improving nuclear security; and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy.  
Promoting Nuclear Disarmament 
On 24 September 2009, President Obama chaired a session of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) which culminated in the unanimous adoption 
of UNSC Resolution 1887. 1887’s main provisions provide a good 
overview of the Obama Administration’s priorities: a revitalized 
commitment to work toward a world without nuclear weapons; 1  a 
strengthened Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); better security for 
nuclear weapons materials to prevent acquisition by terrorists; full 
compliance by Iran and North Korea with Security Council resolutions. 
But it also backs the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a 
framework that reduces proliferation risk and gives support for key 
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nuclear agreements such as START follow-on, the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 
Amendment.2 
A first step toward realizing these goals was taken on 8 April 2010 with 
the signing, by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, of a New Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). New START limits are ‘modest’ 
but probably the best that could be hoped for given what will be a 
contentious U.S. Senate ratification debate. To give New START 
context, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or the 
‘Moscow Treaty’) signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on 24 May 2002 
set aggregate nuclear warhead limits of 1700-2200 by 31 December 2012. 
This represented a roughly two thirds reduction from the warhead levels 
permitted each side under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START 1). However, the reductions were less than they appeared as no 
limits were placed on ‘non-deployed’ warheads. Thus warheads could be 
placed in storage rather than destroyed and ‘uploaded’ again at any 
time. 
The New START limits, to be reached within seven years, are as follows:  
• 1,550 warheads;  
• 800 deployed and non-deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) launchers, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) 
launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; and  
• 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers equipped for 
nuclear armaments. 
The 1,550 warhead limit is 30 percent lower than its predecessor but 
New START, like the Moscow Treaty, gives each side substantial 
‘upload’ capacity as it is silent on warheads in storage and counts each 
heavy bomber as carrying one warhead regardless of how many it can 
actually carry.3  
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New START limits are calibrated to the Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR), which provides a roadmap for U.S. nuclear strategy and was 
released on 6 April 2010. Beyond the reliance on the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program (extending the life of nuclear weapons rather than 
developing new nuclear warheads) and the centrality now attached to 
preventing nuclear terrorism, the 2010 NPR is not a departure from the 
past.4 The five key objectives identified in the NPR were all shared by 
previous administrations: preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
terrorism; reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national 
security strategy; maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at 
reduced nuclear force levels; strengthening regional deterrence and 
reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and sustaining a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear arsenal.  
The President has committed to “immediately and aggressively pursue 
U.S. ratification” of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
banning nuclear testing. The Clinton Administration failed to organize 
an effective campaign in support of the Treaty and the Senate voted 
against ratification in 1999; the George W. Bush Administration 
opposed CTBT. This is likely to prove a particularly heavy lift given 
scarcity of political capital 5  and skepticism in Congress, particularly 
amongst influential members such as ranking member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Republican Richard Lugar and Senate 
Republican whip Jon Kyl, about the merits of the CTBT. And U.S. 
domestic politics is only one part of the equation: China, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan must also ratify the 
treaty before it can enter into force. 
The Administration also intends to seek a new treaty that verifiably 
ends the production of fissile material intended for use in nuclear 
weapons: a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). But the likelihood of 
successfully negotiating a FMCT is even more remote than ratifying the 
CTBT. India and Pakistan are not interested in limiting fissile material 
production and the intractability of Iran on enrichment makes a cut-off 
look even less realistic. Also working against FMCT is the combination 
of releasing the NPR (which was not embraced by many Republicans), 
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getting New START ratified, the nuclear security summit, NPT Review 
and G8 meeting, which together will likely produce ‘nuclear fatigue’ in 
an increasingly partisan Washington D.C. FMCT becomes an even 
bigger reach if CTBT ratification is also aggressively pursued.  
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation  
The 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference 
has been described as “the biggest failure in the history of this Treaty.”6 
Due to fundamental disagreements between member states, it took ten 
days for an agenda to be adopted and no substantive final document was 
presented at the concluding plenary. There has been intense activity at 
the Preparatory Committee meetings to ensure that the 2010 Review 
Conference does not suffer the same fate. 
The Administration is placing particular emphasis on discouraging 
member states from using the NPT withdrawal provision (Article X) in 
order to avoid penalties for violating the Treaty. North Korea is the 
model and it is feared that Iran has similar intentions. An important 
mechanism for avoiding this sort of breakout is the NPT’s Additional 
Protocol. The Additional Protocol grants expanded rights of access to 
information and sites in order provide assurances about both declared 
and possible undeclared activities. Pakistan, Israel and North Korea 
have not signed the protocol; Iran, India and Belarus have signed but 
the agreements are not yet in force. The U.S. delegation will be pushing 
hard for all member states to sign and bring the Additional Protocol in 
to force as well as “real and immediate consequences” for NPT violators 
and those trying to withdraw from the treaty “without cause”. 
Another topic of great importance for the United States will be the 
chronically underfunded International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The Administration is asking for more resources and more authority to 
strengthen international inspections. The IAEA receives funding chiefly 
from two sources: annual base rate contributions (derived from the scale 
used by the United Nations to assess member contributions) and 
voluntary contributions. The Obama Administration has requested from 
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Congress a $79.5 million voluntary contribution for fiscal year (FY) 2011 
– an increase of $17 million over the FY 2009 Bush Administration 
budget. But the United States cannot and should not be expected to 
carry the load by itself. It is the responsibility of all members to provide 
the Agency with the funding and other tools it needs to conduct its 
work.  It is instructive that in 2009, following intense U.S. lobbying, the 
IAEA received its first budget increase above inflation since 2003. 
According to Reuters, the Board of Governors agreed to a 5.4% boost 
after “six months of tortuous talks.”7 If the IAEA is to effectively carry 
out its safeguards mission and assist newcomers to develop responsible 
and sustainable nuclear power programs – according to the IAEA, more 
than 60 countries are considering incorporating nuclear power into their 
energy portfolios – member states will need to do better than 2.7 percent 
above inflation after six months of debate. 
Improving Nuclear Security 
On 5 April 2009 in Prague, President Obama announced his 
administration’s goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material around 
the world within four years. After getting off to a slow start – no 
additional funding for nuclear security was requested in FY 2010 – the 
Administration has begun to turn words into deeds. The FY 2011 budget 
request, if fully funded by Congress, would increase funding for all 
programs dedicated to improving controls on nuclear weapons, material 
and expertise from $707 million to $1.018 billion. Of particular note, the 
request includes a 67% funding increase from $334 million to $559 
million for the Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative to expand the removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
from sites around the world and accelerate security upgrades for HEU-
fueled research reactors and radiological materials and a 8% funding 
increase from $300 million to $325 million for the Department of 
Energy’s Material Protection, Control and Accounting programs; and 
the newly proposed $74 million Global Nuclear Lockdown program at 
the Department of Defense which would, amongst other things, 
establish regional nuclear security “centers of excellence” to provide 
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training, host workshops and exchange best practice on modern security 
and accounting procedures and equipment.8 
From 12-13 April in Washington D.C., the Nuclear Security Summit 
dedicated to strengthening nuclear security and reducing the threat of 
nuclear terrorism was attended by leaders from 47 nations and three 
international organisations – the largest gathering of heads of state 
called by a U.S. leader since the San Francisco conference founded the 
United Nations in 1945. The summit communiqué endorsed key U.S. 
objectives such as: securing all vulnerable nuclear material in four years; 
invigorating national efforts to improve security and accounting of 
nuclear materials; and converting HEU-fueled reactors to low enriched 
uranium. An accompanying work plan detailed the specific steps needed 
to achieve the communiqué’s goals. A follow-on summit has been 
scheduled for 2012 in South Korea to assess progress and set new goals. 
Promoting Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
During a 2004 speech at the National Defense University, President 
George W. Bush called for the Nuclear Suppliers Group to refuse to sell 
enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to “any state 
that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and 
reprocessing plants.”9 However, critics claimed that this objective was 
undermined by the then-Department of Energy’s Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership, which relaxed some of the more restrictive 
language in its Statement of Principles after it became clear that 
countries like France and Japan would not join if their preferred 
methods of reprocessing were not permitted and others such as Canada 
and Australia expressed concern that membership would commit them 
to never develop enrichment facilities, a potentially lucrative value-add 
for countries with large natural uranium reserves.  
The Obama Administration’s “new framework” for civil nuclear 
cooperation also emphasizes preventing the further spread of technology 
relevant to nuclear weapons development. A centerpiece of this 
framework to ensure that countries have access to nuclear energy for 
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peaceful purposes while minimizing the risks of proliferation is the 
creation of an international fuel bank, which would maintain a low-
enriched uranium stockpile to support nations that choose not to build 
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. On 29 March 2010, the IAEA 
and Russia signed an agreement to establish such a reserve for supply to 
IAEA member states that will be located in Angarsk, Russia. While the 
fuel bank is meant as a supplier of last resort – the commercial nuclear 
fuel market functions efficiently – it is hoped that the reserve will 
reassure countries tempted to develop domestic enrichment and fuel 
fabrication facilities due to concerns that future fuel supplies may be cut 
off for political reasons. The Administration has also expressed interest 
in the provision of “cradle-to-grave” nuclear management services to 
newcomers by countries that already possess fuel cycle facilities. 
Conclusion 
The Obama Administration has put the ‘nuclear’ issue on the front 
burner. The nuclear security and disarmament agenda is ambitious and 
the upcoming NPT Review Conference, the June Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism annual conference and the joint meeting of 
the G8 and G20 also in June, provide important opportunities to 
maintain the momentum and expand the engagement. Obama has 
already called for a ten year and $10 billion extension of the G8’s effort 
to stop the spread of WMD and an expansion of those efforts to 
countries not previously eligible for assistance.10 
It has been reported that the third NPT Preparatory Committee 
meeting, held in May 2009, was “a much-needed success story, with 
much of the credit given to the Obama administration's more positive 
approach to multilateral diplomacy and arms control”.11 But the extent 
of the divide between the nuclear weapon states and a large number of 
the non-nuclear weapon states should not be underestimated. Problems 
that bedeviled the 2005 Review Conference remain; in particular, how to 
treat nuclear outliers: India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. In 
addition, the lack of international consensus on dealing with Iran’s 
nuclear program and the U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation 
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agreement – inherited from the Bush Administration and supported by 
the current Administration as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group – will 
further complicate negotiations at the Review Conference.  
It is unlikely that the states that maintain the U.S. and Russia are not 
living up to their Article  VI obligation to “pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race” will be won over by New START but modest reductions are better 
than none and it is a step in the right direction, particularly given how 
strained U.S.-Russian relations have been in recent years. It also 
remains to be seen how the non-nuclear weapon states respond to the 
Administration’s commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world. But the 
Obama Administration has raised the public profile nuclear 
disarmament, nonproliferation and security. The key now is to ensure 
continued high-level international buy-in.
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Australia’s Nuclear Policy Options— 
Past, Present, and Future? 
Andrew O’Neil* 
 
Overview 
 
This policy brief focuses on Australia’s policy options in the nuclear 
realm in a global context where demand for nuclear energy is at 
unprecedented levels and the integrity of the non-proliferation regime is 
facing severe challenges. In a rapidly evolving international 
environment, Australian governments may have to confront some 
uncomfortable policy choices in the years ahead, including whether 
Australia continues to export uranium, whether it continues to reject 
the consumption of nuclear energy, and the extent to which Australian 
remains committed to not pursuing the option of nuclear weapons 
acquisition.     
 
Australian nuclear policy: contemporary settings 
 
The costs for Australia resulting from the use of nuclear weapons 
anywhere in the world would be significant; the economic, security, and 
political impact on Australia of even the most limited use of nuclear 
weapons in Asia would be monumental. The likely implications of a 
nuclear exchange—widespread destruction of social well-being, massive 
economic dislocation, and the devastation of regional order—would have 
substantial and enduring implications for Australia’s national interests. 
 
Largely as a consequence of this realisation, since the early 1970s, 
stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to states and 
non-state actors across the international system has been a core 
objective of Australia’s strategic policy. Crafting effective strategies to 
combat global proliferation has been a key task of successive Labor and 
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Liberal-National Party governments, and a considerable amount of 
Australia’s limited diplomatic resources have been committed to nuclear 
non-proliferation. 
 
Yet for much of the post-1945 period, successive Australian 
governments were not particularly concerned with the spread of nuclear 
weapons capabilities worldwide. Like a number of other middle powers 
that would later become active proponents of nuclear non-proliferation, 
Australia remained favourably disposed towards nuclear weapons in the 
1950s and 1960s. The primary reason for this was that Australia—like a 
number of other countries in the international system—wanted to keep 
its options open. A strong supporter of the US and UK weapons 
programs, the Menzies Coalition government had explored the 
possibility of having British nuclear weapons stationed on Australian 
territory. Under the Gorton government, serious thought was given to 
developing an indigenous Australian capability.1 Coupled with genuine 
concerns about the impact of a new nuclear safeguards system on 
Australia’s commercial nuclear interests, this resulted in an 
unwillingness to ratify the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
following its entry into force in 1970. 
 
Not until the advent of the Whitlam Labor government in 1972 did 
Australia commit itself formally to renouncing the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. While the Whitlam government exhibited a strong 
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation domestically and 
internationally, the brevity of its time in office meant that it never 
developed detailed policies and an integrated diplomatic strategy in this 
area. This was left to the Fraser government, which confronted a range 
of new nuclear-related challenges after it assumed office in late 1975, 
including how to ensure that the development of Australia’s national 
nuclear industry complemented the global non-proliferation 
commitments made by the previous government. 
 
The Fraser government’s decision to approve the resumption of 
Australian uranium exports in 1977 was accompanied by the first 
detailed statement of Australia’s non-proliferation policy and the 
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emergence of an active strategy in the area of nuclear diplomacy. With 
occasional readjustments, these settings have essentially been 
maintained under Labor and Coalition governments ever since. The 
underlying themes of Australia’s approach to nuclear issues—the 
importance of multilateral initiatives, a strong focus on Asian nuclear 
dynamics, middle power activism, and the nexus between security of 
nuclear supply and safeguards—have remained remarkably consistent 
over the past three decades. Of all the various dimensions of Australian 
foreign policy, opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapon enjoys, 
arguably, the highest degree of bipartisanship among all political 
parties. 
 
Writing in 1975, Hedley Bull made the point that “Australia’s ability to 
promote [nuclear] arms control arrangements relevant to her security is 
very limited; the success or failure of attempts to achieve these 
arrangements depends more on the policies of other countries than upon 
Australia”.2 Australia may have global interests, but it is not a global 
power. The stakes for Australia in limiting the number of nuclear 
weapons powers worldwide, particularly in Asia, are very high but its 
influence remains limited. This helps to explain the strong preference on 
the part of governments for multilateral approaches to non-
proliferation, particularly the use of UN sponsored institutions. 
 
Australia’s involvement in international nuclear issues has been shaped 
largely by the various regulatory frameworks underpinning global 
nuclear interactions. Over the past four decades, the NPT and its 
assorted satellite initiatives—particularly those in the nuclear export 
control realm—have been integral to achieving many of Australia’s 
nuclear policy goals. Should the operation of these regulatory 
frameworks be seriously compromised, Australian policy makers would 
be forced to operate in an environment inimical to the interests of 
weaker powers in the international system. As Allan Gyngell has noted, 
Australia has a long-standing preference for multilateral approaches to 
dealing with key foreign policy challenges, which in turn mirrors a belief 
that “as a middle-sized power, Australia alone cannot shape the world 
and that the country’s interests are best served by encouraging the 
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development of international norms and laws that would help balance 
Australia’s relative weakness”.3 
 
As it has evolved since the mid 1970s, Australia’s nuclear policy has 
been shaped overwhelmingly by clear-cut material considerations. This 
is not to overlook the role that normative factors have played in 
influencing the opinions of elites—the principles and norms embodied in 
the NPT have undoubtedly reinforced the commitment of Australian 
policy elites to the goal of non-proliferation. But they have not been the 
dominant, or even a major, determinant of Australia’s non-proliferation 
activity. In short, “ideational” influences have been marginal in shaping 
Australian nuclear diplomacy. What, then, have been the factors driving 
Australia’s engagement in this area of public policy? 
 
First and foremost has been the imperative of preventing other states in 
Asia from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. Central to this is a 
belief that proliferation in the region will have deleterious implications 
for Australia’s security and economic interests by undermining the 
regional equilibrium through the promotion of instability. Even if one 
assumes there is minimal prospect of nuclear weapons actually being 
used, their operational deployment can still have destabilising effects on 
regional security dynamics. In addition to preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons in the region, Australian policy makers have also had a 
strong desire to avoid making decisions about military force structure in 
response to proliferation. In the contemporary environment, such 
decisions can be effectively deferred in the context of US extended 
deterrence for its Asian allies, including Australia. As the 2009 
Australian Defence White Paper noted: 
 
[F]or as long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to 
rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter 
nuclear attack on Australia. Australian defence policy 
under successive governments has acknowledged the 
value to Australia of the protection afforded by 
extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance. That 
protection provides a stable and reliable sense of 
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assurance and has over the years removed the need for 
Australia to consider more significant and expensive 
defence options.4 
 
Yet even if we accept that the credibility of US extended deterrence is 
watertight, there is no guarantee that the US will continue to extend its 
nuclear deterrent to Australia in an era where Washington is raising the 
barriers to nuclear use.5 From the perspective of strategic policy makers, 
the potential for such a scenario unfolding makes preventing further 
proliferation in Asia a key policy imperative. While Australia could 
conceivably manufacture its own indigenous nuclear deterrent to 
respond in-kind to nuclear weapons acquisition in Asia (see discussion 
below), it is difficult to imagine any Australian government that would 
not want to avoid such an extreme review of force structure. 
 
The second rationale underpinning Australia’s active nuclear policy has 
been economic. Labor and Coalition governments appreciate that the 
optimum international environment for Australian uranium exports—
which account for approximately $500 million in income per annum—is 
one where the overwhelming majority of countries remain committed to 
forswearing the acquisition of nuclear weapons through membership of 
the NPT. A central theme in the pronouncements of governments since 
the 1970s has been that Australian uranium exports play a critical role 
in strengthening global non-proliferation measures because Australia 
insists on particularly stringent preconditions for export, the most 
salient of which is a state’s membership of the NPT and its acceptance 
of full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. 
Any unravelling of the NPT, and the non-proliferation regime more 
broadly, would inevitably decouple the link between uranium exports 
and non-proliferation goals in Australian policy. It would, in short, 
undermine one of the central declared justifications for uranium exports. 
Were the NPT to collapse and the world experience a substantial jump 
in the number of nuclear weapons states—with the prospect of more to 
come, especially in Asia—it would acutely problematic for governments 
to justify the export of Australian nuclear fuel internationally.  
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Third, broader political considerations cannot be underestimated as a 
factor in Australia’s nuclear policy. Governments on both sides of the 
spectrum have appreciated the political benefits to be gained 
domestically of being seen to bolster Australia’s international profile on 
nuclear issues. There remains a significant and still influential anti-
nuclear constituency within the Australian polity that governments, 
particularly Labor governments, endeavour to reach out to. Linking 
nuclear non-proliferation with nuclear disarmament has widespread 
appeal in the Australian electorate and, from the perspective of 
governments, helps to deflect attention from Australia’s export of 
uranium and the nuclear dimension of the US alliance, something that 
still divides Australian public opinion. The political dimension is also 
international in scope. There are distinctive foreign policy benefits for 
Australia of pursuing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which 
is recognised as something of a signature campaign for middle power 
“good international citizens”. The utilitarian calculation of sunk costs 
has also been influential in shaping Australia’s diplomatic engagement 
on nuclear issues, with successive governments acutely aware of past 
energy expended, resources committed, and national prestige attached 
to improving and strengthening the non-proliferation regime. This, in 
itself, continues to be an important motivating element in Australia’s 
activist approach to non-proliferation. 
 
Future nuclear policy options? 
 
Australia’s overriding preference is for the maintenance of the 
international nuclear status quo. The status quo is far from perfect: 
there have been three new Asian nuclear powers to emerge since the end 
of the cold war, the global non-proliferation regime has grown 
increasingly fragile over this time, and nuclear terrorism is perhaps more 
conceivable than it ever has been. It is, however, important to 
appreciate that the contemporary nuclear environment for Australia 
could be a lot worse: the likelihood of deliberate use of nuclear weapons 
by states is probably lower than at any time since 1945, nuclear-capable 
states in Asia (e.g. Japan, South Korea) continue to exercise restraint, 
and the overwhelming majority of states in Asia remain committed to 
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the NPT and the confidence-building assurances that underpin nuclear 
safeguards.  
 
As a secondary power, Australia does not have many options to promote 
a global nuclear environment conducive to its security—Australia’s 
nuclear policy choices in the years ahead will almost certainly continue 
to be highly reactive in substance. Given the fluid nature of the 
international environment, this could make for some interesting shifts in 
Australian policy. In this sense, as Rod Lyon argues, Australia’s nuclear 
future in the early part of the twenty-first century is by no means 
assured: 
 
Australia’s previous patterns of thinking about 
nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy provide useful 
insights into its possible future behaviour. 
Australia’s thinking has traditionally reflected a 
basic level of ‘fit’ between the existing security 
environment and its own role in the world. The 
comfort of that fit has shifted with time, so much so 
that over the past fifty years Australia has been 
everything from a possible nuclear proliferator, to a 
supporter of extended nuclear deterrence, to an 
important advocate of nuclear arms control. Those 
previous shifts suggest Australia’s twenty-first 
nuclear identity might not yet be fixed.6 
 
Australia’s nuclear policy settings in the contemporary context are 
based on three broad commitments: continuing involvement in the 
nuclear fuel cycle as a supplier of uranium; the rejection of nuclear 
energy consumption; and the disavowal of nuclear weapons. It is 
important to emphasise that none of these are set in stone and any of 
them could be subject to close review in the event of significant shifts in 
Australia’s external environment. 
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Involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle as a supplier of uranium 
 
As noted, Australia’s continuing role as a supplier of uranium is closely 
linked to the ongoing coherence of the non-proliferation regime. From a 
domestic political perspective, the export of Australian uranium has 
never been justifiable on purely economic grounds: a key argument on 
the part of export proponents has been that if Australia chooses to opt 
out of the global market as a supplier, the gap will be filled by less 
scrupulous suppliers who will not be as focused on insisting on wide 
ranging nuclear safeguards as a precondition of export. From this 
perspective, Australia is able to leverage its status as an attractive 
source of supply under long term contract arrangements—due largely to 
its stable political system and track record of sound economic 
management—to promote wider adherence to the non-proliferation 
regime. 
 
The expansion of the international civilian nuclear energy market, 
particularly in Asia, presents enormous commercial opportunities for 
Australian uranium exporters, with one analyst identifying more than 
thirty states worldwide that plan to construct nuclear reactors for the 
first time.7 However, the increasingly brittle nature of the global non-
proliferation regime raises questions about the sustainability of 
Australia’s role as a major nuclear supplier. North Korea’s acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, the apparent drive from Iran to become a threshold 
nuclear weapons state, and the lack of engagement on the part of all 
other nuclear weapons states (besides the US, Russia, and the UK) with 
meaningful arms control and disarmament initiatives raises some serious 
issues for the credibility of the NPT as a proliferation-containment 
mechanism. If the upward trend in nuclear proliferation since the end of 
the cold war continues, the non-proliferation regime will effectively 
disintegrate over the next two decades, if not sooner. If this happens, 
Australia will find it very difficult—indeed probably impossible—to 
sustain its role as a nuclear fuel supplier in an environment where robust 
regulatory frameworks for international nuclear transactions no longer 
apply. 
 
 55 
 
Rejection of nuclear energy consumption 
 
The Rudd government’s unconditional rejection of nuclear energy 
consumption for Australia has been one of the defining features of its 
approach to nuclear issues since coming to office. While the previous 
Howard government held a relatively open-minded attitude to the issue 
following the release of the landmark 2006 Switkowski nuclear review—
the recommendations of which endorsed the limited pursuit of nuclear 
power options—Prime Minister Rudd has remained adamant that the 
risks associated with nuclear power, coupled with Australia’s “multiple 
energy sources”, disqualify it from serious consideration.8 This position 
enjoys widespread support in the Australian polity, and there are only 
very few (most prominently the chair of the board of the Australian 
Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Ziggy Switkowski) who 
have been willing to openly challenge the government’s position. Even 
the nuclear industry in Australia has been conspicuously low-key on the 
issue. The government’s policy position seems broadly reflective of 
public ambivalence in relation to nuclear energy consumption. 
 
Yet, developments in this area could evolve very quickly. Public 
opposition in Australia to nuclear power would harden considerably in 
the event of a major nuclear accident at a civilian plant anywhere in the 
world. Equally, however, strong popular support for nuclear power 
production in Australia could develop rapidly in the event of 
dramatically accelerated climate change impacts over a short period. 
Aside from disagreement over the security risks of building and 
maintaining nuclear reactors, there is continuing debate about whether 
the necessary infrastructure for nuclear power production could be built 
quickly enough to make a difference in mitigating the effects of climate 
change.9 Against a background where Australia’s demand for electricity 
is reportedly set to double by mid century and where Australia’s carbon 
emission reduction targets are becoming increasingly ambitious every 
year, the nuances of such a debate could quickly become superfluous if 
evidence of exponential climate change impacts emerge. According to 
projections by the IPCC, exponential impacts could be manifested in 
significant rises in temperature to 2.6 degrees above 1990 levels over the 
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next three decades.10 An even more sobering possibility is abrupt climate 
change of the type that triggered the end of the last Ice Age—an 
increase in global temperatures by 5 degrees over a single decade.11 
 
Disavowal of nuclear weapons 
 
For most analysts, the idea of a nuclear-armed Australia is something 
that belongs to the history books and has no place in this country’s 
twenty-first century strategic discourse. Indeed, it seems a fantastic—
and faintly Strangelovian—postulation that Australia could well feel the 
need to review its status as a non-nuclear weapons state in the coming 
decades. Yet, contrary to common belief, Australia could well achieve a 
threshold nuclear weapons status if the decision was taken to go down 
this path. It is one of several technologically advanced countries in Asia 
(along with Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) to possess 
proficiency in nuclear fuel cycle technologies and a historical track 
record of voicing sympathy for the weapons option. Discussion over the 
potential of Australia becoming a nuclear weapons state—or at the very 
least achieving a threshold nuclear capability—has never disappeared 
entirely from the national strategic discourse. Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, successive defence strategy planning documents broached the 
issue of threshold status and on at least one occasion, the issue was 
raised in discussions among senior ministers.12 While the topic dropped 
away from view for most of the 1990s, it has experienced something of a 
mini-resurgence—in public and private discussions—within the 
Australian strategic studies community over recent years. 
 
Like the nuclear power production issue, it would take a dramatic series 
of events for Australia to review its non-nuclear weapons status. 
However, for policy makers to begin actively exploring the weapons 
option would require the intersection of a greater number of variables 
than required in the case of nuclear energy consumption. These 
variables, occurring in isolation, would probably not be sufficient to 
precipitate such a radical shift in Australian strategic planning. They 
would have to coalesce to yield an unprecedented, “game changing” 
security environment for Australia. The following sorts of variables 
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would be required to trigger a shift towards nuclear weapons in 
Australia’s strategic posture. The first would be the rapid proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and/or superior conventional war-fighting 
capabilities in countries which Australia regards as a possible security 
threat. The second would be a serious loss of confidence in the credibility 
of extended deterrence guarantees (either nuclear or conventional or 
both) from the United States. And the third would be a direct threat to 
Australia’s vital sovereign interests, an existential threat of the type 
that Stephan Fruhling has described.13 
 
All of these specific scenarios are, of course, feasible, but they would 
themselves be a corollary of broader shifts in the international system: 
e.g. a retreat in America’s global role, the breakdown of regional security 
order in Asia. It should be of little comfort to Australian policy makers 
that these are potential outcomes over which they would have almost no 
control. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The international nuclear environment will continue to evolve in ways 
that challenge Australian policy makers. Choices about uranium 
exports, the consumption of nuclear energy and, possibly, the option of 
a threshold weapons capability will confront decision makers in the 
years ahead. The global non-proliferation regime may continue to exist 
on paper in formal terms, but the regime could conceivably suffer a 
terminal decline in the event that Iran follows North Korea down the 
nuclear weapons path. The regime has provided a key political and 
strategic framework for Australia’s engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle 
over the past forty years: Australia will undoubtedly struggle in a global 
environment where a coherent regulatory mechanism for nuclear affairs 
ceases to be effective. 
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 
  
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